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I too think it quite certain that a real change in the relations of human beings to possessions would be of more 
help…than any ethical commands. (Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents) 
 
In order not to be paralysed with shame I have had to live a life of getting over the worse. What I cannot get 
over any more is that getting over. (Coetzee, Age of Iron) 
 
Here’s what I’d like you to write: I’m proud of the part of me that isn’t European. I’m proud of the things in me 
that Europeans find childish, cruel and primitive. If the Europeans are beautiful, I want to be ugly; if they’re 
intelligent, I prefer to be stupid; if they’re modern, let me stay simple. (Pamuk, Snow) 
 
 
I began this essay on July 11th 2005, four days after the terrorist attacks in London, where I live. There 
can be no case for forgiving the bombers. It is unthinkable that one should recommend it to the 
surviving victims or the relatives of the dead. They could hardly begin to imagine it. Nor could I, had 
my son been killed. So much is morally obvious, and needs no emphasis. Nonetheless, the question 
everywhere at stake in my essay is whether the (undoubted) unforgivability of the terrorist is as much a 
matter of our sense of the self-evidence of a principle of justice as we are told we should think. Amidst 
all the familiar expressions of outrage in the days after the bombings, one voice alone stood out: that of 
the ex-CIA agent (of all people) who suggested that the situation that had produced the bombings 
would hardly change until the West understood that it must change its language. It is not clear that the 
idea of intellectual responsibility still has any serious meaning. None the less: if it does still signify, if 
the idea of the intellectual in any serious sense of that word, and of the burden he or she might wish to 
assume, can still be conjured with, it is perhaps in relation to a rigorous practice of complication on the 
one hand, and the (necessarily arduous and exacting) elaboration and dissemination of an ethical 
language on the other. The two tasks are closely linked. The language in question would be rare and 
new: that is, as far as possible, distinct, not only from the “ethical” languages currently in circulation, 
not least in political circles, but, more contentiously, from the dominant languages of the postmodern 
ethics of difference. The character of such a language must remain unforeseeable and unpredictable. 
But the major contemporary novelists ― Morrison, Coetzee, Sebald, Pamuk ― have struggled to 
supply it or, at least, to sustain a liminal conception of it. They in some degree provide a model for 
contemporary intellectual work. 
However obliquely and elliptically at times, this essay pleads for a closer scrutiny, both of our 
conviction of justice, and of the language in which we articulate it. The word `fanaticism’ seems  
peculiarly impoverished. Young men and women are destroying others by immolating themselves: 
                                                 
1 I specify Europe in my title, as does the quotation from Pamuk’s Snow; as indeed, both Pamuk and 
Jambet’s work, insofar as it treats of the West, is almost exclusively concerned with a relation 
specifically between Europe and Islam. Despite all the recent abject political efforts in the UK, I would 
not want to identify what is at stake in the European too closely with what is at stake in the American 
relation to Islam, still less with what has been at stake in Israel’s relation to it since Sharon came to 
power. Islam has long been Europe’s neighbour, as it has not been America’s. For all the geographical 
and historical differences in question, I hope that American readers will not find themselves excluded 
by my `we’. In any case, my focus is necessarily and deliberately very unsteady, and even within the 
first few lines the strictly mythical notion of `the West’ appears. The unsteadiness has its own very 
specific significance. By Europe, I mean fortress Europe in the sense in which Jacques Rancière 
defines it in `L’inadmissible’. See Aux bords du politique (Paris: La Fabrique, 1998), pp. 128-47. Here 
what Rancière calls a `disenchanted rationality’ proposes a kind of local and separate justice which 
distinguishes acceptable forms of misery, marginalization and disempowerment which it can address 
from unencompassable ones which it cannot. It thus proceeds on the basis of a `savage ontology' made 
evident precisely in its concepts of admissibility and inadmissibility. The Islamic world becomes a 
segment of the new proletarii, those not to be admitted within the walls of triumphant Rome. The new 
proletarii are in one sense excluded in a classification, reduced to a singular and monolithic entity 
precisely so that they can be held at bay. The relevance of the contemporary question of the inclusion 
of Turkey in Europe is clear here. I touch on it later. 
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what drives them to do so must be extraordinarily remote from our habitual frames of reference. As 
Christian Jambet makes clear, it would be mistaken to suggest that Ismaeli messianism and the 
Assassins of Alamut provide a forecast of modern terrorism.2 But the parallels are sufficiently close 
and significant to indicate how foreign the domain in question might be.3 It is worth at least supposing 
that the motive of present-day suicide bombers ― however indefensible its consequences ― may be a 
passionate conviction of the need to call what they take to be the unjust powers to radical account. 
Hence my concern in the following four short meditations is not principally with the unforgivability of 
the terrorist, but rather with the persuasion of the excited young man at the political meeting in Orhan 
Pamuk’s Snow that I began by quoting.4 The young man is not a terrorist, but it is easy to imagine him 
becoming one. He speaks on behalf of a culture profoundly convinced that it has been spurned, that it 
has been historically abandoned to its fate by another that is in fact patently more ignoble than itself. 
Bearing in mind that, in the phrase of Jacques Rancière, `toute la misère du monde, nul n'est tenu de 
l'accueillir',5 that no-one can assume the burden of the world's misery, it is worth asking, all the same, 
whether the contemporary Western project must find itself, in truth, ultimately, inexorably doomed to 
the charge of historical unforgivability.  
If so, what may in retrospect appear to have doomed it is a failure that was also conspicuous in 
late imperial Rome: the will to insouciance, freedom from care.  
 
i) Insofar as an idea of adequacy is appropriate to the demand of the Other, can the ethical subject 
indeed prove adequate to that demand? It is by no means evident that the Other does indeed command 
us from a height; in which case, ethics cannot really be first philosophy. If the Other commands us 
from a height, our carelessness becomes the more perplexing. We slight the desert beyond the security 
of our citadels in which the Other is ceaselessly deprived, suffers and dies so that we may live as we 
do. The pure but unheeded necessity is, not only that a road-map must prevail, but that the desert itself 
no longer exist. For as long as it exists, no `postmodern ethics’ is possible. Lacan’s admonition is 
resonant: `“there is no satisfaction…outside the satisfaction of all”’.6 
 How was it supposed that the Other could command me from a height? For Levinas, in the 
encounter with alterity, the Other definitively overflows, is in excess of the frames within which my 
ego, powers of cognition, consciousness or intuition would seek to contain him, or her. The Other 
always proliferates beyond my sphere of reference, which therefore disintegrates. Levinas might be 
thought of as classically modern, here: what must be demonstrated, as, say, Proust and D.H. Lawrence 
seek to demonstrate it, is the baselessness of the dream of possession of the Other. In the very failure 
― the necessary failure ― to possess the Other, the structure in which I sought to ensnare him or her is 
laid bare. It is exposed as a resistance to complexity, to multifariousness, to dimension ― inseparable 
from my will to be myself, to persist as myself, to flourish and to prosper in and as what I am, to 
bunker down in my properties. On the one hand, what is at stake is a repetition compulsion that, as 
`Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ tells us, tends in the direction of mineral inertia. On the other hand, 
what is also at issue is my sense of entitlement to my patch, the space, materials and resources to which 
(I suppose) I with justice stake my claim. Levinas repeatedly returns to a phrase of Pascal’s: what 
ethics most radically calls in question is my conviction of my right to a place in the sun, my right to 
bask carelessly in its warmth.  
 We know the structure of the Levinasian experience of ethics, but it is worth briefly 
rehearsing it again. As my imperiously assertive self undergoes the failure of its drive to enclose the 
                                                 
2 See Christian Jambet, La grande résurrection d’Alamût: Les formes de la liberté dans le shî’isme 
ismaélien (Paris: Verdier, 1990), pp. 27-29. Jambet tells us that he is disputing the claims of Bernard 
Lewis. For a recent version of Lewis’s argument, see `Preface’, The Assassins: A Radical Sect of Islam 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), pp.  viii-x. 
 
3 For a relevant discussion, see Jambet, `Introduction’, La grande resurrection, pp. 9-32. 
 
4 See Orhan Pamuk, Snow, tr. Maureen Freely (London: Faber and Faber, 2004), p. 285. 
 
5 `L’inadmissible’, p. 146. All translations from French are my own, except where otherwise specified. 
 
6 Jacques Lacan, Seminar Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-60, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, 
tr. with notes by Dennis Porter (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 292. I have omitted the words `for the 
individual’. In this context, I also mean the phrase to apply to a limited interest or a specific civilization 
or culture. 
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Other, so I recognize the violence that is intrinsic to that drive. The encounter with the Other strips 
away the mystifications by which I aim to disguise my own violence from myself. It produces what 
Levinas calls a `dégrisement’, a disenchantment, specifically, a `disenchantment of subjectivity’.7 The 
failure of my will to possession makes of the encounter an occasion to which I must rise for a second 
time. I now no longer hope to reduce the Other to my terms. I rather offer myself to the other, respond 
to and become responsible for him or her. The Other is now a drastically sobering antidote to what 
Levinas calls self-intoxication.8 It undermines the fantasy of sovereignty entertained by my ego and 
draws me into social life, dialogue, persuades me of the need for generosity of spirit. In it lies the 
possibility of rescue from what is otherwise the `cynical’ mode of life.9 Marxism once challenged 
liberal idealism and its promotion of the autonomous self, thus breaking the `harmonious curve’ of the 
development of European culture.10 Now it is ethics that must bear the burden of that task. I take this 
thought to underlie much of what has recently been known as postmodern ethics. 
 Alain Badiou has summarily and, I think, devastatingly interrogated the Levinasian structure 
as a sufficient foundation for such an ethics.11 There is no great difficulty in seeing where the problem 
lies: it is not clear why the failure of the subject’s first encounter with the Other should of necessity 
lead to the second. The logic at stake is undeclared. Badiou exposes it with simple, brilliant clarity: it is 
and can only be theological. What is it that ineluctably enjoins my devotion to the Other? Why do I 
find myself yielding to him, or her? 
 
The Other, as he appears to me in the order of the finite, must be the epiphany of a 
properly infinite instance to the other, the traversal of which is the originary ethical 
experience. 
 This means that in order to be intelligible, ethics requires that the Other be in some 
sense carried by a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience. Levinas 
calls this principle the `Altogether-Other’ and it is quite obviously the ethical name for 
God. There can be no Other if he is not the immediate phenomenon of the Altogether-
Other. There can be no finite devotion to the non-identical if it is not sustained by the 
infinite devotion of the principle to that which subsists outside it. There can be no ethics 
without God the ineffable.12 
 
However concealed as such, ethics, says Badiou, is always a species of pious discourse. Without piety, 
no ethics. 
We might be inclined to assume the self-evidently post-theological character of our world. 
Badiou makes no such assumption. Keenly aware of the drive within postmodernism towards 
obscurantism, of a culture inclined to turn back on its steps, he not only firmly and rightly commits 
                                                 
7 See Emmanuel Levinas, La mort et le temps (Paris: L’Herne, 1991), p. 25; and my Postmodernity, 
Ethics and the Novel (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 25-26.  
 
8 See Levinas, La mort, ibid. 
 
9 See Collected Philosophical Papers, tr. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), p. 25. 
 
10 See Les imprévus de l’histoire, preface de Pierre Hayat (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1994), pp. 33-34.  
 
11 Given my argument, here, I should perhaps make clear how I now read Postmodernity, Ethicvs andf 
the Novel. I do not dissent from very much in it ― certainly not the readings of texts. The book sought 
to promote a postmodern ethics of fiction. Like Thomas Docherty’s, my understanding of 
postmodernism was very much Lyotard’s (postmodernism as a continuation and acceleration of 
modernism), not the competing definition (postmodernism as the cultural dominant of the social-
democratic phase of neo-liberalism). That battle has now been lost. More crucially, I would now also 
concede that it is not possible to read Levinas in the mode of `atheist transcendence’, as Simon 
Critchley and I both sought to in the nineties. In that sense, I would ideally want to recast some of the 
discourse in my book. The shift in my thought has of course been very precisely historically 
determined. Some of the factors 1999-2006 should be self-evident to many readers. Some, like the 
dismayingly swift conflation of English postmodernism with the “culture” of New Labour, may not be. 
 
12 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, tr. with an introd. Peter Hallward 
(London: Verso, 2001), p. 22. 
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himself to renewing the strictly necessary conviction of the great modern `destroyers’ that thought only 
begins on the further side of religion.13 He also takes up their work of destruction again; that is, he is 
not only atheistic, but militantly atheistic. In `Dieu est mort’, he is starkly clear: firstly, the `living God’ 
of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is definitively dead. Claims to have encountered him are merely 
psychosocial manifestations, symptoms of a pathological condition. At the popular level, contemporary 
religion is just simulation, `theatre’, doxa, a pitiful State formation (ibid.). Secondly, the God of 
speculative metaphysics, Spinoza’s God, was never really alive in the first place. He was a source of 
meaning and truth and, as such, an instrument in the rationalist war on the living God. God is dead:14 
yet as long as finitude remains the ultimate determination of Dasein, God remains as its unnameable or 
unattainable horizon, and we ourselves remain prey to nostalgia. Modern mathematics, however, can 
cleanse us of God and nostalgia together. For it makes thinkable an actually existing, accessible 
infinity, and thus effects a  `radical desacralization’ of eternity (CS, p. 164). It brings to an end the post-
Hegelian and post-romantic conception of infinity as a boundless exteriority, an openness without end, 
which always threatens to reintroduce the theological principle. With modern mathematics, the 
deconstructive insistence on the vestiges of piety becomes obsolete.  
 It is to Levinas, says Badiou, that we owe our current fashion of `ethical radicalism’.15 Levinas 
is the very root of the `“recognition of the other”’, respect for alterity, the `“ethics of difference”’, 
`“multiculturalism”’, even the return to `good old-fashioned “tolerance”’.16 However, without the 
theological sanction, the logic of these concepts collapses. Violence of thought has always defeated 
tolerance in advance. On the one hand, the ethical postmodern subject will always be left to weep 
quietly as the Rumsfelds and Cheneys of the world continue their operations. On the other hand, we 
have the extraordinary contemporary phenomenon of liberal coercion, whereby postmodern ethics 
expeditiously becomes law in order that it should not abruptly reveal its own groundlessness. This is 
Agamben’s lesson: no ethics can survive without foundations save by invoking some form of sovereign 
decree. This leaves us in an apparently issueless predicament that is the determining condition for 
every ethical theme, including forgiveness. Forgiveness involves the abrogation of a demand made by 
the ego. If we follow Agamben and Badiou, it is evident that no plausible or durable mechanism of 
forgiveness arises or can arise from postmodern ethics, save in a particular, hypocritical form. We are 
certainly seeing enough of this hypocrisy around us. 
 We might specify, as Badiou does not, what remains of the Levinasian structure once we have 
done with the `Altogether-Other’. The question, here, is why the collapse of the Levinasian logic of 
ethics necessarily entails the triumph of violence. Levinas described his work as a whole as directed 
against the Spinozan conatus essendi.17 The key definition of the conatus is implicit in the sixth 
proposition in the third book of Spinoza’s Ethics: `Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours 
[conatur] to persevere in its being’.18 The conatus is precisely this work of persistence in self-assertion. 
For Spinoza, no virtue can be conceived’ as prior to it (E4, P3), and it is `the first and unique basis of 
                                                 
13 The term is Derrida’s. See Jacques Derrida, `Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences’, in Writing and Difference, tr. with an introd. and additional notes by Alan Bass (London: 
Routledge, 1978), pp. 351-70, pp. 354-56, especially at p. 356. Derrida specifies Nietzsche, Freud and 
Heidegger. 
 
14 Lacan’s declaration to this effect is at least as important to Badiou as Nietzsche’s. See Lacan, 
Seminar Book VII, p. 292. 
 
15 Badiou, Ethics, p. 18. 
 
16 Badiou, Ethics, p. 20. 
 
17 It is interesting to note that Badiou, too, not only engages with the Spinozan theory of the conatus, 
but takes it to be in some sense definitive of human being without a saving grace (for Levinas, ethics, 
for Badiou, truth). See for instance Ethics, p. 46, 53.  Badiou’s concept of truth as the consequence of 
the alea has no theological dimension. Interestingly again, however, a world without truth would not 
exactly meet with moral disaster, as would Levinas’s world without the Altogether-Other. It would 
rather be a world of no account. I reflect on this at length in my reading of Badiou in Beckett and 
Badiou: The Pathos of Intermittency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2006). 
 
18 Spinoza, Ethics, ed. and tr. G.H.R. Parkinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 171. 
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virtue’ (E4 P22).19 As sheer desire to persist,20 to claim one’s right to a place in the sun, the conatus 
may indeed be inseparable from self-sameness, from what Thomas Docherty has called the identity-
principle.21 But it is not that principle itself. It must in some sense be thought of as prior to subjectivity, 
and therefore as not caught up in or problematized by postmodern deconstructions of the subject.22 This 
is one way of understanding the impasse at which postmodern ethics has quickly arrived. Nothing will 
dismantle the conatus from within. In Spinoza’s terms, it is only an exterior force that can hinder 
persistence in being. Indeed, `[t]he force by which a man perseveres in existence is limited, and is 
infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes’ (E4 P3).23 But the Spinozan ethical subject is 
hardly overpowered by the obstacles in question. For the conatus is in itself an expression of the power 
of God. Levinas’s radical move is precisely to reverse the identification of the conatus with God. God 
is the obstacle: the Altogether-Other now blocks or inhibits the conatus. Subtract the Altogether-Other 
from a structure from which Spinoza’s divine monad has already vanished, and it should be clear what 
we are left with. `Appetite’, writes Spinoza, `is nothing other than the very essence of man’ (E3 P9).24 
As Levinas himself well knows, in Spinozan terms, freedom (libertas) is the condition of being true to 
the conatus, successful persistence in one’s being. If we take Levinas’s Atogether-Other out of his 
equation, what remains is the world as a manifestation of universal appetite. 
  
ii) This might appear to be obvious. But of course we both know it and do not know it, know it and 
resist our knowledge. The century of disaster has left us weary of staring at the Gorgon: hence the 
current flight back to theologies and neo-theologies. Hence, too, what Badiou has rightly identified as 
the massive contemporary return to Kant.25 Our ambivalence is surely evident in our displaced but 
irrepressible, recurrent disgust with ourselves in the form of the democratic politicians we 
democratically elect, and who represent us. The liberal and postmodern-liberal ruse is to shift 
responsibility: it was the other that elected them, not me. But the dinner-table declamation does not 
finally show how clean my hands are. It rather demonstrates the reverse, that I cannot erase my own 
complicity or forget that my will to dis-identification has certain apparently insurmountable limits.26 In 
a Spinozan gloss, those limits are determined by the imperiousness of the conatus. 
The great account of the logic at stake in this ethical switchback still seems to me to come in the 
fifth chapter of Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, and Lacan’s meditation on it in the fourteenth 
                                                 
19 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 230. 
 
20 More than `appetite’ or `will’, desire is Spinoza’s most frequent term for the conatus in its human 
aspect. 
 
21 Thomas Docherty, After Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996). See in particular 
9.1, pp. 245-53. 
 
22 Cf. the Spinozan critique of akrasia, weakness of will, as a problem that should in principle be 
overcome. 
 
23 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 230. 
 
24Spinoza, Ethics, p. 172.  
 
25 `What essentially is retained from Kant…is the idea that there exists formally representable 
imperative demands that are to be subjected neither to empirical considerations nor to the examination 
of situations; that these imperatives apply to cases of offence, of crime, of Evil….’ Ethics, p. 8. What 
price deconstruction (and its politics), one might ask, and, insofar as the `imperatives’ are a question 
for the subject, what price its `death’. 
 
26 The classic figure, here, might in fact seem not to be the (postmodern) liberal, but the Metromarxist 
with the million-pound home, than whom no-one is more hostile to `middle-class melancholia’ as a 
discourse of privilege. Certainly he or she is a uniquely powerful reason for melancholy in him- or 
herself. But the true epitome of my argument on 26 March, 2006 is the more honourable figure of 
Norman Kember, British pacifist held hostage in Iraq who, when freed, finds himself thanking the SAS 
men who effected his release whilst insisting that they should not be in Iraq at all, becoming an object 
of right-wing satire in the process. The point is, not that the right must always have the best cards, but 
that the repeating game keeps on playing into their hands; on, and on, and on. 
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and fifteenth sections of Seminar VII. It would be mistaken to suppose that thought has somehow 
`moved on’ beyond these texts. Something like the reverse is the case: as with certain other great 
modern meditations, here thought arrived at an impasse within which we continue helplessly to circle. 
Both texts are chiefly concerned, not with the individual psyche, but with what Freud calls civilization. 
The relevant insistence is this: it may be that, if forgiveness is possible at all, is it so only in relation to 
a phantasm, a structure of misrecognition, a necessary turn away from the murderous, unforgivable 
imperative of jouissance. Freud raises the question everywhere in his critique of the idea of `loving 
one’s neighbour as oneself’ (which he explicitly relates to the theme of forgiveness).27 The passage is 
something of a locus classicus in modern thought: 
  
The element of truth behind all this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men 
are not gentle creatures who want to be loved…their neighbour is for them not only a 
potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their 
aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him 
sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him 
pain, to torture and to kill him. Homo homini lupus. Who, in the face of all his experience 
of life and of history, will have the courage to dispute this assertion?28 
 
In the first instance, the question is whether the ethical subject could ever love the lupine creature to 
which Freud refers. How can I love him or her as myself? He or she wants to appropriate my goods. He 
or she wants to abuse me, to inflict suffering on me, to deprive me of my place in the sun. I perceive in 
him or her `the frightening core of the destrudo’ which Lacan tells us is confronted everywhere in 
analytical experience, and of which any denial is mere affectation and quibble.29 I cannot forgive my 
neighbour for what I know about him, or her: `my neighbour’s jouissance, his harmful, malignant 
jouissance, is that which poses a problem for my love’.30 
 But this is only the first and simplest aspect of the problem, and not of great importance to 
either Freud or Lacan. Certainly, as Lacan says, Freud has a horror of forgiveness. But this is not 
principally because of the feral antagonism that I and my neighbour must feel for one another. It is not 
chiefly because we know we are both aggressors that I cannot forgive my neighbour. Indeed, it is 
doubtful whether the aggressiveness in question is ever more than fleetingly manifest to me as being 
mine as much as his. There is another, more important barrier to forgiveness: I cannot love the other 
precisely because I identify in him the destrudo that I can only see in him and not in myself, that I have 
even transferred to him in order not to see it in myself. The real difficulty with forgiveness comes with 
the reflex of disavowal that Freud mentions. I cannot forgive my neighbour because he bears a burden 
that I cannot but place on him in order not to have to confront it in myself. In fact, my neighbour is as 
near to me as the heart `within which is that of my jouissance which I daren’t go near’.31 Hence Freud’s 
horror: disavowal is the very mechanism by civilized society sustains itself. The psychic and/or social 
consequences of a refusal to project my jouissance on to my neighbour are potentially catastrophic. 
 There are still more turns to the screw. I cannot love my neighbour, not just because I 
recognize the wolf in him, but because he does not. Outrageously, he too thinks he has his reasons. As 
much as the threat of his jouissance, I cannot forgive my neighbour his mystifications of it, the 
specious glosses he confers upon it, the deceit and self-deceit he practises in relation to it. I cannot 
forgive the (theological, moral, economic, political) justifications he finds for what I know to be his 
malice towards me. I cannot forgive him, not only his untruthfulness, but his lack of self-awareness. 
Nor can I endure his refusal to recognize his mystifications for what they are. Furthermore, he even has 
the gall to assume that it is I, not him, who am untruthful in this way. I certainly cannot forgive him for 
such an assumption. For that matter, I must not be exposed to any risk of seeing in my neighbour the 
                                                 
27 See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vo. 21, tr. Joan Riviere, revised and ed. James Strachey 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1979), p. 47.  For the reference to forgiveness, see fn. 1. 
 
28 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 48, first italics mine. 
 
29Lacan, Seminar VII,  p. 194. 
 
30 Lacan, Seminar VII, p. 187. 
 
31 Lacan, Seminar VII, p. 186. 
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mirror-image of my own disavowal. Indeed, I need my neighbour to be unforgivable. I need his fixity 
in evil, his unswerving dedication to it. That is why, if possible, his evil should amount to a positive 
faith or cause. The detestable and patently flawed ideology which my neighbour espouses makes his 
unforgivability all the clearer, because it shows him to be wrong as well as evil. Logically enough, my 
disavowal of my own jouissance intensifies the force with which my neighbour’s jouissance manifests 
itself. If the superego, which is my aggression turned back upon itself, must also disavow my 
aggression, then, in making aggression so imperious as to require disavowal, it also makes it matter 
more, and thereby sharpens it. In fact, as Freud himself drily remarks, `high ethical demands’ put ` a 
positive premium on being bad’: 
 
One is irresistibly reminded of an incident in the French Chamber when capital 
punishment was being debated. A member had been passionately supporting its abolition 
and his speech was being received with tumultuous applause, when a voice from the hall 
called out: `Que messieurs les assassins commencent!’32 
 
It is imperative that the assassins carry out their activities so that the Deputies can retain their assurance 
of being spotless. 
So, too, our high-minded (democratic, humanitarian, rights-based) ethics requires certain 
formal figures of evil against which to define itself. It is through these figures that we know our own 
good, which is otherwise exposed to question. The efficient functioning of our institutions requires that 
we ceaselessly issue our anathemata. Whether in war or peace, it is essential that the process continue. 
The better we become, the more we need yet another avatar of the Grand Assassin or the Savage 
Predator who will enable us to continue proving that we are not him. On no account must he be 
properly forgivable. `Under these conditions’, writes Lacan, `it is hardly surprising that everyone is 
sick’.33 
 
iii) Without the step backwards to a theological sanction, a postmodern ethics of forgiveness is 
unsustainable and a fantasy. There is no adequate secular foundation for such an ethics. Not 
surprisingly, some of the greatest writers have excoriated the very idea of forgiveness. It generates 
irony or becomes the object of saeva indignatio. Take Heine, for example: 
 
My wishes are: a humble cottage with a thatched roof, but a good bed, good food, the 
freshest milk and butter, flowers before my window, and a few fine trees before my door;  
and if God wants to make my happiness complete, he will grant me the joy of seeing 
some six or seven of my enemies hanging from those trees. Before their death I shall, 
moved in my heart, forgive them all the wrong they did in my lifetime. One must, it is 
true, forgive one’s enemies―but not before they have been hanged.34 
 
Or Beckett: 
 
Let me say before I go any further that I forgive nobody. I wish them all an atrocious life 
and then the fires and ice of hell and in the execrable generations to come an honoured 
name.35 
 
Experts, these, in the winding stratagems involved in the mystification of jouissance: an infinity of 
radiant smiles ― politicians, celebrities, models in commercials, girls on mobile telephones ― inform 
us that we may claim our place in the sun. Meanwhile, here and there, noiselessly, obscurely, like one 
of Beckett’s sandpiles, the desolation of the world creeps on. 
In the eighties it was Coetzee, in the nineties, Sebald, too: in the present decade, no novelist is 
producing larger panoramas of desolation than Orhan Pamuk. To those who have travelled in central or 
                                                 
32 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 48. The translators render this as `It is the murderers who 
should make the first move’.  
 
33 Lacan, Seminar VII, p. 187. 
 
34 Gedanken and Einfälle, section one. Quoted in Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 47, fn. 1. 
 
35 Trilogy (London: John Calder, 1997), p. 180. 
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eastern Anatolia, his accounts of forsaken towns and cities (The New Life, Snow) will be bleakly 
familiar. This is a denuded world repeatedly forgotten by the imperial powers that busily traversed it, 
subjecting it to casual devastation as they did so. Today’s empires remain oblivious both to it, and the 
vast Asiatic hinterland of which it is a token. No-one holidays in Kars.36 Whether writing about 
Anatolia or his beloved Istanbul ― which he tends to see as having become a forgotten city ― Pamuk 
has a great deal to tell us about the difficulty Europe feels, has always felt in loving its neighbour, 
Turkey. No doubt he is not especially concerned to do this. He may be critical of European ignorance 
about, exploitation of, condescension and indifference to Turkey in particular and, more generally, the 
Near East and the Islamic world. But he also clearly feels an affection and admiration for modern 
European achievements, notably in art and thought. His work is partly driven by a spirit of emulation. 
Indeed, it is crucial that Pamuk not lapse into resentment or invective, that he remain deftly, wittily, 
fantastically at a distance from his material, that that is what constitutes his superiority to the greater 
powers. Rage would betoken defeat or enslavement.  In one of its aspects, Pamuk’s is even a work of 
redemption from obscurity. It is crucial, not only that Turkey and, beyond it, Islam, be noticed, 
represented, but also that they be represented apart from the staple images in which Europe has long 
represented them. Pamuk is partly concerned to make us hear voices from the landscapes of desolation 
that stretch from the Golden Horn to the Armenian border and beyond. He does this, however, on his 
terms and theirs, not ours.  
But for the European reader, Pamuk also opens up a space of negativity. He turns repeatedly 
to the theme of being `under Western eyes’. The Western gaze ― the `diminishing European gaze’37 ― 
is what indicts Turkey of `shameful poverty’. Only night and shadow make Istanbul `safe’ from it (I, p. 
32). The Western gaze is intensely problematic, not so much in its presence as in the fact that it is 
always a gaze from on high, that it invariably presses downward. What breaks the Turkish heart is not 
the material success of Europe as opposed to Turkish `failure’. It is the European assumption that 
questions of material success are intrinsic to hierarchies of value; or rather, (to return to Freud and 
Lacan), since Europe both believes and does not believe this, the strange, Moebius-strip logic by which 
any interrogation of or challenge to those hierarchies of value always twists back into reassurance 
about or persistence in them. Take `the unimaginably huge burdens of hamals’ (I, p. 212), Istanbul 
porters who carry on their backs piles of tin metres high: Istanbullus are happy to see these porters 
photographed by themselves. They are deeply uneasy when they are photographed by European 
tourists. For the European presence invariably introduces the vector of shame. Pamuk’s work struggles 
to reverse or at least to deflect that vector. From a European perspective, it should be read in terms of a 
cultural symptomatology; that is, it should be turned inside out, brought to utter what Pamuk himself 
must necessarily avoid saying, at least, in his own voice. For what is everywhere inscribed but nowhere 
explicit in Pamuk’s work, save in certain characters, like Doctor Fine in The New Life, is the 
unforgivability of Europe (and America, too).  
As reviewers have repeatedly said, Pamuk’s fiction thrives on the fact that, like Turkey itself, 
it is poised on a geo-political cusp whose critical significance has both historical and cultural aspects. 
But, compelling though Pamuk’s grasp of the issues undoubtedly is, they are no more important to his 
work than the theme of shame. It is precisely in his treatment of that theme that Pamuk piles up the 
evidence against the West. He gives no impression that he intends to do this or even that he knows he is 
doing it. It appears to happen almost by accident, as though the material itself supplies all that is 
necessary to the logic of indictment. Pamuk does not level accusations. He rather exploits what, with 
reference to postcolonial fiction, I once called the `split-space of reception’ to place the Westerner in a 
position of self-enquiry if not self-accusation.38 He does this, above all, through his insistence on 
hüzün. For all its expanding portrait of the rich concreteness and even vitality of Turkish culture, 
Pamuk’s fiction is caught up in hüzün as its single, most dominant mood. Hüzün is the Turkish word 
                                                 
36 The eastern Anatolian town in which Snow is set. For a slightly earlier account which confirms 
Pamuk’s picture of ruin, destitution and raw liveliness, see Philip Glazebrook, Journey to Kars: A 
Modern Traveller in the Ottoman Lands (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 127-36. 
 
37 Orhan Pamuk, Istanbul: Memories of a City, tr. Maureen Freely (London: Faber and Faber, 2005), 
hereafter cited in the text as I; p. 38. 
 
38 See Postmodernity, Ethics and the Novel, pp. 194-209. I am grateful to John Stotesbury for pointing 
me towards a new way of thinking about this theme in an interesting recent paper on Lelia Aboulela’s 
Minaret. One issue that my paper raises, if incidentally and problematically, is the question of a newly 
emergent, European/American split-space of reception, but with reference, not to fiction, but to 
intellectual and scholarly discourse.  
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for melancholy. It has no place in European representations of the East. Yet, as Pamuk well knows, 
historically, Europe has long had its own versions of hüzün. They are, however, intensely foreign to 
contemporary Europe. In effect, like equality and justice in any important senses of those words, hüzün 
is presently one of the great, repressed European themes. One might think of it as constituting part of 
the buried life of the contemporary European psyche. At this point, the question of forgivability 
becomes equivocal, for the problem for Europe becomes, not only its abandonment of Turkey, but 
finally also of its failure to care for itself. This failure is itself subject to the Moebius-strip logic insofar 
as Europe assumes the reverse, that it has finally come to know exactly what its own interests must be, 
and that its present success in pursuit of them is incontrovertible. 
In Istanbul: Memories of a City, Pamuk devotes a whole chapter to hüzün: 
 
…when it appears in the Koran….it means much the same as the contemporary Turkish 
word.  The Prophet Mohammed referred to the year in which he lost both his wife Hatice 
and his uncle, Ebu Talip, as `Senettul huzn’, or the year of melancholy; this confirms that 
the word is meant to convey a feeling of deep spiritual loss. (I, p. 81) 
 
Here, precisely, the `split-space of reception’ is at issue. For Pamuk, hüzün has a paradoxical cast: it 
functions as an index however muted of `spiritual agony and grief’ (I, p. 81), and therefore of 
profondeur. However, from Avicenna to Sufi tradition and beyond, it is also a source of pride, of a life 
that continues in its very capacity for such emotions to proclaim that it is worth living. This acute sense 
of value is luminous simply in the melancholic beauty of the many photographs in Istanbul. However, 
pride is not a response that is available to Pamuk’s Western reader (assuming that reader to be non-
Islamic). As far as hüzün is concerned, Pamuk’s Western reader is differently situated. 
Hüzün has to do with loss, ruin. As such, as Pamuk repeatedly says, it can concern the 
community, the city, the nation as much as the individual person. Here the logic of hüzün is inseparable 
from a conviction of abandonment. In fact, Pamuk is the great exponent of the world of hüzün that 
begins immediately outside the walls of fortress Europe.39 Its logic is the very logic of Western 
unforgivability. It is this aspect of hüzün with which Pamuk confronts his European reader. From a 
European vantage-point, his work provides a powerful and astringent check to any cheerful, 
`progressive’, contemporary ethics.  In effect, it calls into radical question any contemporary ethics that 
shirks hüzün. What Pamuk starkly gives us to think is that no contemporary ethics that turns aside from 
the landscapes of hüzün can seem more than, at best, a bagatelle or epiphenomenon, at worst, a 
strategic distraction from what Walter Benjamin called `catastrophe in permanence’.40 
 The root of Turkish hüzün is radical displacement or dispossession. If Istanbul is a city of 
dilapidated or ruined homes, then the sense of homelessness has become a defining condition: `Istanbul 
has been a city where, for the past hundred and fifty years, no one has been able to feel completely at 
home’ (I, p. 103). This condition is inseparable from the steadily more evident if `haphazard and 
gloomy’ displays of `Western influence’ in Turkey (I, p. 10). The growth of European economic and 
cultural power and the destitution of the Turkish oikos go hand in hand. The point, however, is not 
European influence in itself: Ottoman Turkey was Western-influenced. The point, indeed, is that 
Europe has precisely not filled the gap left by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It has not erased 
                                                 
39 This is not to suggest that there is or can be a logical Eastern frontier to Europe. Is the Caucasus 
more logical than the Bosphorus? What exactly would a Europe be that included a part of Asia Minor? 
A Europe definitively concerned to imagine itself together with its other, rather than assimilating him? 
Might it also be a Europe that cannot relinquish the aspiration to be more than just itself, therefore by 
definition an uncompletable project, therefore doomed never to be a forgivable one? Or turn in the 
other direction: there is an argument for saying that hüzün begins a lot further west than the Bosphorus, 
say, in the Balkans. But `fortress Europe’ is of course a conceptual, even an ideological entity as much 
as a geographical or empirical one. Conversely, hüzün is not merely a `subjective’ mood, but inheres in 
landscapes, material cultures. Hüzün is a quality of objects (dirty coca-cola bottles in Trabzon; the 
rusting wrecks of merchant ships on the shores of the Black Sea; the traces of crumbling Istanbul 
masonry on your fingers. Contrast the stunning beauty of Istanbul as painted repeatedly in the early 
nineteenth century by Antoine-Ignace Melling). For a suggestive commentary on the political 
topography of melancholy, see Wolf Lepenies, Melancholy and Society, tr. Jeremy Gaines and Doris 
Jones (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
 
40 For what Benjamin means by this, see `Central Park’, Selected Writings Vol. 4, 1938-40 (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 161-99, passim. 
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Ottoman culture; it has rather let it remain as an inchoate set of fragmented traces drifting ever further 
from their historical meaning, and therefore a source of torment. Certainly, like rosebay willow herb 
rampant amidst ruins, European culture is unrelentingly invasive. But even as it tightens its grip on 
Turkey, an insouciant Europe also does not really want to embrace it. It rather leaves weak, pallid, 
second-order replicas of its own culture in its wake. In itself, as Pamuk repeatedly says, Europe 
remains distant from and unavailable to Turks (including those domiciled in Europe itself). Hüzün is 
the ineluctable consequence of this predicament. There is, however, an irony, here, that is at once both 
piquant and macabre: left to themselves (that is, uninstructed by the Turkish writer), however 
subliminally, Europeans may intuit the melancholy that is to some extent of Western making, but only 
to convert it into the `mystery’ of Istanbul, finding the ruinous state of the city charming if not 
romantic. Thus Gautier wrote about the frequent fires amidst the old wooden houses of Istanbul with 
something like excitement and delight.  
 Europe squats in domestic space like an alien presence: `Sitting rooms’, writes Pamuk, of 
middle-class Istanbul houses before the 1970s, `were not meant to be places where you could hope to 
sit comfortably; they were little museums designed to demonstrate to a hypothetical visitor that the 
householders were Westernized’ (I, p. 10). If Pamuk’s father’s constant travelling and the unhappiness 
of his parents’ marriage, or the authority of German as opposed to Turkish nannies, are anything to go 
by, the psychic power of Europe has invaded the home in more senses than one. The displacement and 
adulteration of Turkishness, of the extraordinary density of a historical culture on which the West is 
stamping a sell-by date: these are manifested in Pamuk’s work in far more various and complex ways 
than I can cover here. Take Doctor Fine’s evocation, for instance of the loss of historical time in 
objects. Objects have traditionally held memories. They have served as repositories of time, a time 
fixed in matter itself. Then came Coca-Cola, Ronson lighters, Lux hand soap, UHU glue, AEG 
refrigerators, Crescent Gas: 
 
But as soon as he put these articles in his store which was so serene that it seemed to 
exist in a former time, he realized that not only could he no longer tell the time, he didn’t 
know what time was. Not only he but also his merchandise had been distressed ― much 
like nightingales who are disturbed by the presumptuous finches in the next cage ― by 
the presence of these lacklustre, prosaic objects….41 
 
With the invasion of Turkey by modern European business, a relationship between culture, history and 
the material world comes under threat and begins to disintegrate. What enters in its stead is hüzün; 
hüzün, that is, as it cannot but be: the mirror-image of Capital triumphans. 
 But perhaps the most striking evocation of the self-alienation effected by the European 
intrusion is Jelal’s account of Master Bedii in The Black Book. Master Bedii is a traditional Turkish 
mannequin-maker, an artist in his craft. His work is prohibited, but he continues it unperturbed.  Then, 
in excitement, with the early years of the Westernizing republic, he sees the new interest in mannequins 
in clothes-shops. This, he assumes, must be his opportunity. Not at all: his mannequins look too much 
like Turks: 
 
A hardboiled window-dresser, after being dazzled by Mater Bedii’s masterpieces, 
explained that in the interest of his own livelihood, he unfortunately could not place these 
“authentic Turks, these real citizens” in his windows: Turks nowadays didn’t want to be 
Turks anymore but something else. That’s how come they’d instituted a code of proper 
attire, shaved their beards, reformed their tongues and their alphabet. A more laconic 
store owner pointed out that his customers did not buy an outfit but, in truth, bought a 
dream. What they really wanted to purchase was the “dream” of being like the others 
who wore the same outfit.42 
  
Bedii returns to his masterpieces of art.  What these masterpieces at length convey, however, is a shock 
so acute as to constitute `a kind of terror – gruesome, grievous and dark!’43 For they demonstrate in 
their most ordinary gestures, `be they nose wiping or belly laughing, walking or casting unfriendly 
                                                 
41 Pamuk, The New Life, tr. Güneli Gün (London: Faber and Faber, 1997), p. 127. 
 
42 Pamuk, The Black Book, tr. Güneli Gün (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), p. 54. 
 
43 The Black Book, p. 55. 
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looks, shaking hand or uncorking a bottle’, how unlike themselves Turks now are. The modern Turkish 
body leads a substitute life that `came in canisters from the West and played by the hour in cinemas’.44 
The West has usurped somatic life. It has found its way into the most intimate and casual zones of 
physical experience and expression. The `terror’ and `grief’ produced by this recognition translate into 
the appropriately muted form of hüzün. Hüzün is inseparable from the loss involved in the production 
of modern Turkish ersatz, here understood at the level of the myriad vagaries of mundane corporeal 
life. 
 `Although everyone knew it as freedom from the laws of Islam’, writes Pamuk, `no one was 
quite sure what else Westernization was good for’ (I, p. 10). As Blue spells out in Snow, if, here and 
there, the West produces democracy, this is only according to its own conception of democracy: `Can 
the West endure any democracy achieved by enemies who in no way resemble them?’.45 
Westernization certainly does not lead of itself to liberalization or encourage cosmopolitanism. `No one 
who’s even slightly Westernized can breathe freely in this country’, remarks Sunay in Snow, `unless 
they have a secular army protecting them’.46 `After seeing all the wealth of the Middle East seep out of 
their cities’, Pamuk asserts, `Istanbullus became an inward-looking, nationalist people; we are therefore 
suspicious of anything new, and especially anything that smacks of foreignness. (Even if we covet it)’ 
(I, p. 186). The irony is that, however modern or indeed postmodern its supposed principles, insofar as 
it cannot but manifest itself as a process of exploitation and deprivation, Westernization may 
consolidate if it does not actually breed, not only authoritarian and repressive government, but the 
myopia, parochialism and violence of nationalism and fundamentalism themselves. The failure of 
generosity in the forms of Westernization available to Turkey does not open minds. It hardens them. In 
Turkey, Europe becomes a simulacrum of itself. Here, too, however, in the closeness of that 
simulacrum to parody, Europe may fleetingly glimpse its own Janus face, the poverty of its plenitude. 
Europeans may insist that it is Turkey that designates the limits of their responsibility. In fact, it is here 
that their gestures of abandonment seem most decisive.  
 
iv) Pamuk offers us a picture of Turkey through which we apprehend the desolation of European 
purposes and ends, but in a mirror-image or as a set of traces, by reading against the grain. Yet 
precisely because it is a mirror-image it is also, in one sense, a faithful image. For the Western reader, 
desolation appears according to the Freudian and Lacanian double-bind, in the vestigial forms in which 
alone it is thinkable. Pamuk himself is shrewd enough (or Westernized enough) to know this. He is 
well aware of his own complicities. Indeed, to some extent, for Pamuk as for Heine and Beckett, the 
struggle with the double-bind constructs itself as an ironical, Swiftian snare.  
But what if there were an element that even Swift, Heine, Freud, Lacan and Beckett had not 
been able to factor into the equation, a thought not given them to think because, though still evident in 
a certain strain of Islamic philosophy, it had long been lost to the Western mind? In a complex, 
involved body of philosophical and scholarly work that now spans nearly twenty-five years, Christian 
Jambet has been meditating on the significance that the philosophy of esoteric Islam might have for the 
West.47 Importantly, though Jambet’s work is everywhere concerned with theology, he insists that it is 
not theological in itself. His field is rather the philosophy of religion: here the question becomes, not 
what it is possible to know about God, but what it is possible to know about one history of thought by 
examining another. At one point in La logique des Orientaux, in particular, Jambet argues that the 
                                                 
44 The Black Book, p. 56. 
 
45 Snow, p. 233. 
 
46 Snow, p. 207. 
 
47 The distinction between exoteric and esoteric Islam is everywhere crucial in Jambet. Exoteric Islam 
is the outward law or formal clothing of religion, as supremely in Shari’a law, the canonical law as first 
put forth in the Koran and Sunnah, elaborated by the analytical principles of the schools and adhered to 
by both Shi’ite and Sunni muslims. It is concerned with matters of orthodoxy in social and political 
life, and suited to the generality of believers, intelligible to the public. Esoteric Islam, about which 
Jambet chiefly writes, is a question of theological teachings derived from the Koran and Islamic 
revelation. In Sufism, for instance, it is concerned with an inward path of mystical union, with the 
dividing line between world and God. Esoterism is the religious centre where exoterism is its 
circumference. It consists of doctrines communicated to and intelligible by initiates. 
It betokens a spiritual journey where exoterism betokens dogma.  
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Heideggerian concept of the `forgetting of Being’ has misled us. It is not Being that, beginning with 
Plato, Western thought forgets. It is rather the `cassure intérieure’, the radical, interior break between 
two ontologically distinct realms inaugurated by Plato himself. `Forgetting’ begins with Aristotle, who 
thinks Being as homogeneous, lacking in qualitative difference. From Aristotle onwards, the thought of 
the break is steadily erased.  
This thought, with its `duality of poles’ ― no question for Jambet of dismantling `binary 
oppositions’; the issue is rather whether we have not long ceased to think the truly significant duality 
― insists on a structure of ethical differentiation that is situated at the very heart of Being.48 Islam has 
long continued to incorporate the remnants of this Platonic scheme, as Western philosophy has not. But 
this is, to say the least, no simple matter. On the one hand, Avicenna made Aristoteleanism integral to 
exoteric Islamic tradition and Shari’a law. On the other hand, a tradition deriving from Plato, Plotinus 
and Hellenic neo-Platonism continues if fitfully to insist in esoteric Islam from Suhrawardi through the 
Ismaelian theologians of Alamut and Sufism to Mulla Sadra and beyond. This tradition, lost to the 
West, is concerned with gnosis, illumination, the casting of light into obscurity. The coincidence in our 
culture of Islamophobia and anti-Platonism may not be altogether fortuitous. Indeed, by yet another 
twist of the Freudian and Lacanian screw, it may be in the very territory that supposedly harbours our 
enemies that the image of our particular, intimate loss ― as opposed to Pamuk’s ― most poignantly 
appears. For Jambet shows us that esoteric Islam offers a sumptuously elaborated thought of radical 
unworldliness. 
If the Platonic `cassure’ presents a `duality of poles’, it also presents us with the `enigmatic 
topology’ of `the symbolic narrative of the Cave’.49 Jambet asks us to think the gnostic traditions of 
esoteric Islam in what might seem to be paradoxical terms, as involving a polar structure that is also 
extremely complex and subtle. The complexity and subtlety emerge above all in the nuancing of the 
division between the two ontological realms, a kind of maximal resistance to dualism within dualism 
itself. Much of Jambet’s work is effectively devoted to the meticulous description of this 
extraordinarily fine system of nuance. I shall briefly discuss a single aspect of it, the concept of the 
`imaginal world’.  
From Suhrawardi to Mulla Sadra, the imaginal is a median world between spirit and matter. 
Jambet describes it as composed of `spiritual matter’, `phenomenal substances’ not subject to the dense 
time and space of our material world, existing in a temporality and spatiality subtler than those of 
which we are most conscious, or to which we are most accustomed.50 Sadra in particular asserts `the 
full ontic autonomy of psychic reality’.51 Jambet’s most extended discussion of the theme of the 
imaginal world comes in 2.3 of his book on Sadra, L’Acte d’être.52 The chapter is entitled `The 
Imagination’. On the one hand, in Sadra’s conception of it, the imagination never leaves the world and 
always borrows from experience. On the other hand, it grasps essences in particular, epiphanic forms 
which, as events, are not exactly of the world, in the sense that, like all unpredictable occurrences, they 
are not what the world foresaw. Sadra tends specifically to privilege the visionary imagination, as in 
dreams and premonitions, which he understands as belonging to the imaginal world. In doing so, he 
decisively separates immateriality from universality. He is a great thinker of `immaterial 
particularity’.53 Memory is not one of the imagination’s superior functions. But it provides a simple 
example of the particularity in question. The imagination as memory prevents sense-impressions from 
dispersing, guards them as a treasure trove. It is as immaterial particularities alone that they survive.  
For Sadra, the imagination is habitually at the service of the thinking mind, that is, it rejects 
images not coinciding with exteriority. It begins its own proper work only when or insofar as the 
                                                 
48 Jambet, La logique des Orientaux: Henry Corbin et la science des formes (Paris: Seuil, 1983), p. 
151. 
 
49 Jambet, La logique des Orientaux, ibid. 
 
50 Jambet, La grande resurrection, p. 210.  
 
51 See James Winston Morris, `Introduction’, The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Mulla Sadra (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 3-85, p. 37. 
 
52  See Jambet, L’Acte d’être: La philosophie de la revelation chez Mullâ Sadrâ (Paris: Fayard, 2002), 
pp. 277-342, esp. pp. 310-21. 
  
53 L’Acte d’être, p. 300.  
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thinking mind is at rest. The suspension of thought is the liberation of the imagination, as in particular 
in delirium, sleep, fear, childhood fantasy, madness, sickness, dotage. Here the liberated soul takes its 
vacation from the world. It finds its way amidst imaginative forms that Suhrawardi called `suspended 
citadels’, citadels `without substrate’.54 These forms have a distinct ontological status, that of the 
semblance: like mirror-images, they exist in concreto but not in reality. They have the pure strangeness 
of the mirror-image, which is that of an existence resembling our own, but which we must forever lack. 
Suhrawardi and Sadra’s Platonic inheritance makes it possible for them to have knowledge of this 
world. Avicenna’s Aristoteleanism debars him from it. What is most crucial here, however, is that, 
whilst the imaginal world may represent a stage on the way to release from desire or jouissance, it does 
not constitute a release in itself. In one sense, the reverse: the imaginal world is a world of fulfilled 
desire, `jouissance pleine’,55 but under one sole condition: that the object whereby fulfilment is 
procured is not real. By a weird but beautiful kink of logic, like the mundane world, the `imaginal 
world’ is imperfect, but also an index of a state of virtue.56 
One might be tempted to ask, here, whether art, perhaps modern art in particular, is a 
paradigmatic instance of the imaginal world. But is it really worth attempting a fleeting, casual 
conflation of the two? Do we need yet another grand model for theoretical commentary on modernism? 
Better to talk about specifics. Jambet has little to say about art, even Islamic art. But in the section of 
L’Acte d’être that I have been discussing, there are two references to modern art. The first is to Borges, 
great master of the mirror-image that faithfully reflects the world, but never as the world itself. Borges 
is master, too, of the infinite recession, the endless multiplication of images that both belong and do not 
belong to sensible reality. Borges’s kind of infinity inspires no horror in Suhrawardi. It rather delights 
him, as a display of the riches of the imaginal world. But 2.3 actually ends with the following 
quotation, by way of a different form of example: 
 
Suddenly I fell asleep, plunged into that deep slumber in which vistas are opened to us, 
of a return to childhood, the recapture of past years, and forgotten feelings, of 
disincarnation, the transmigration of souls, the evoking of the dead, the illusions of 
madness, retrogression towards the most elementary of the natural kingdoms (for we say 
that we often see animals in dreams, but we forget that almost always we are animals 
ourselves therein, deprived of that reasoning power which projects upon things the light 
of certainty; on the contrary, we bring to bear on the spectacle of life only a dubious 
vision, extinguished anew every moment by oblivion, the former reality fading before 
that which follows it as one projection of a magic lantern fades before the next as we 
change the slide), all those mysteries which we know and into which we are in reality 
initiated every night, as into the other great mystery of extinction and resurrection.57 
 
This great Proustian exfoliation of the mind is at once sufficiently luminous and complex as, not only 
to fill out what in Jambet remains a rather abstract concept, but also to convey what he might mean by 
the beauty of the imaginal domain and unity with the unreal object of desire. Indeed, in a different 
manifestation, it is that beauty and unity which Marcel will eventually choose, in choosing the forms of 
the satisfaction of desire provided by art, rather than those he has hoped for from life. 
 
I have tried to resist what Beckett beautifully called `the morbid dread of sphinxes’,58 the Sphinx being 
a figure dear to both Freud and Lacan. I have tried to meditate on the problem of unforgivability 
without at any moment suggesting that `I know what to do about it’. My essay provides no sop to (left- 
or postmodern-) liberal consciences (including my own). It offers no recommendations or academic 
                                                 
54 L’Acte d’être, p. 310. Jambet is quoting from Shihaboddin Yahya Suhrawardi, Kitab Hitmat al-
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55 L’Acte d’être, p. 314. 
 
56 See L’Acte d’être, p. 371. 
 
57 Marcel Proust, Within a Budding Grove, tr. C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, revised by 
D.J. Enright (:London: Vintage, 1996), pp. 461-62. 
 
58 Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. with a foreword Ruby Cohn 
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summons to action (`Affirm the imaginal’; `Convert to Islam’). It certainly has no theological 
dimension, and holds out no theological consolation. It serves up no palliatives. No apothegms or 
nostrums are extractable from it. All the same: this world of the suspension of the citadel that I have 
briefly indicated; this world so closely associated with the condition of virtue, available in particular to 
certain `marginal’ or disregarded conditions or states of mind; this world of a desire that (in one sense) 
stops short, satisfied by immaterial particularities, of (perhaps) the modern commitment to art; this 
world seems to me conceivably to be a forgivable one. It is worth noting, too, that, for Sadra, thinking 
the imaginal world also involves a theory of happiness. 
 
 
 
 
